

*Applying History:  
The Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 and  
Behavioralist Theories of Warfare*

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“It follows, therefore, that one way to confirm the validity of theories is to see how successfully they perform *each* of the tasks expected of them. The failure to accomplish a particular task would not necessarily invalidate an entire theory, but it should raise questions in our minds. It would be a warning signal, suggesting the need to rethink underlying assumptions.”

-John Lewis Gaddis, 1992<sup>1</sup>

“Just two hours ago,” President George Bush declared on January 16, 1991, “allied air forces began an attack on military targets in Iraq and Kuwait . . . This conflict started August 2<sup>nd</sup> when the dictator of Iraq invaded a small and helpless neighbor. Kuwait -- a member of the Arab League and a member of the United Nations -- was crushed; its people, brutalized.”<sup>2</sup> The Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 was a startling and critical event in world affairs and international relations.<sup>3</sup> Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait represented the first post-Cold War international crisis; with the opening of the air campaign in January of 1991 Bush and the allied forces thus launched the first serious international war of the post-Cold War world.<sup>4</sup> The response to the Gulf crisis as a whole– not unrelatedly – represented the first significant alliance of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council on a particular issue, and signaled the first instance of significant cooperation and agreement between the United States and Russia since the Second World War. The crisis and the war, it is clear, were critical and transforming events on the world stage.

As the first major international crisis of the post-Cold War world, the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 stands as an important test case for many of the theories of international relations developed during the “long peace” of the Cold War itself. By analyzing these theories in light of

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<sup>1</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” *International Security*, Volume 17, Issue 3 (Winter, 1992-1993), 5-58; 10.

<sup>2</sup> George W. Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf, January 16, 1991. Cited in full online at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91011602.html>.

<sup>3</sup> From this point on this crisis shall be referred to as “the Gulf War,” “the Persian Gulf War,” or “the Gulf crisis.” Unless otherwise specified, all such designations refer to the conflict and crisis of the early 1990s as opposed to either the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s or the current situation in the Middle East.

<sup>4</sup> Flanders, Stephen A. and Carl N., eds., Dictionary of American Foreign Affairs. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993.) 479.

the events of the Gulf crisis – in effect by using the Gulf War as an historical case study – we may be able to reach some general conclusions about these theories and perhaps about the practice of international relations theorizing itself, both in general and during the Cold War. How accurate were the theories of international relations developed during this period? How effective were and are they at, for instance, predicting events or trends or at explaining events? Does the passing of the Cold War and the creation of the “New World Order” of the early 1990s invalidate these theories for all time – or do they stand as enduring and truthful paradigms?

One particularly interesting set of theories, at least from an historical point of view, consists of those related to historical analyses of individual wars and quantitative, “scientific” studies of war and peace. Works such as Geoffrey Blainey’s *The Causes of War*, John A. Vasquez’s and Marie T. Henehan’s *The Scientific Study of War and Peace: A Text Reader*, and even John Lewis Gaddis’ 1992 *International Relations* article on “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War” present and explain these historically-based theories and arguments – what we might choose to call “behavioralist” theories. Such historically-based behavioralist works as Blainey’s have lost some of their prestige in recent years, but nonetheless remain important in both in political science and especially in diplomatic history. The “scientific” styles of analysis described by Vasquez and Henehan, in contrast, are still of great importance in the study of international relations. Indeed, such advocates of quantitative analysis as J. David Singer of the Correlates of War (COW) Project at the University of Michigan have gone so far as to claim that quantitative behavioralist analysis may lead to theories that will finally and conclusively explain the origins and causes of conflict.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> J. David Singer cited in Gaddis, 1992-1993; 12.

Numerous political scientists have criticized such historically-based behavioralists as Blainey as being too intuitive and un-“scientific.”<sup>6</sup> “Classical” behavioralists such as Hedley Bull have attacked quantitative behavioralism as being intrinsically flawed and “pseudo-scientific.”<sup>7</sup> Several quantitative behavioralists, such as Morton Kaplan and Singer himself, have criticized their own school of methodology as being too immature and untested to reach uncontested and accurate conclusions.<sup>8</sup> Still, both historically-based and quantitative behavioralist studies are far enough advanced that we can and should test them by comparing their conclusions to actual events – in this case the Persian Gulf War. Such a comparison raises an important question: can the Gulf War be accurately and effectively understood through and explained by theories of international relations developed by traditional historical behavioralists such as Blainey and quantitative behavioralists such as Vasquez and Henehan?

### **Behavioralism: Historically-Based and Quantitative Theories of War and Peace**

Behavioralism can be understood simply as a theory of political science that suggests that events can be understood and explained by comparing them to past events. Within behavioralism itself there are two major schools: “traditional” or classical historically- and philosophically-based behavioralists on the one hand and quantitative behavioralists on the other. This definition of “behavioralism” is not universally accepted; indeed, a clear definition of the term seems almost impossible to find. John Lewis Gaddis, for instance, suggests that “behavioralism” as a term should refer only to those I would call “quantitative behavioralists,” who seek to analyze international relations through the rigorous empirical study of *all* past events. “The behavioral approach,” he explains, “bases itself upon a key assumption of classical

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<sup>6</sup> Morton Kaplan. 1966. "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations." *World Politics* 19: 1-20.

<sup>7</sup> Hedley Bull. 1966. "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach." *World Politics* 18: 361-377

<sup>8</sup> Kaplan. 1966. J. David Singer cited in Gaddis (1992-1993).

empiricism: that we can only know what we can directly observe and measure.”<sup>9</sup> Behavioralists, he adds, concentrate upon quantification of such observable phenomena as battlefield casualties, voting returns, trade statistics, newspaper stories, patterns of communication, seasons during which wars were fought, arms races, and economic resources.<sup>10</sup>

Gaddis’ definition is, I think, incomplete; his division of theories of international relations into quantitative-behavioralist, structuralist, and evolutionary leaves out such works as Blainey’s. While there are certainly serious problems with *The Causes of War*, it does stand as an analysis of international relations theory and must be understood as an example, however flawed, of behavioralist analysis. Understood in this way, Blainey’s work and Vasquez’s and Henehan’s work are particularly interesting in that between them they highlight some of the major differences between quantitatively-based behavioralists on the one hand and the philosophically and historically-oriented “traditionalists” on the other; in one sense Blainey and the authors whose works are edited by Vasquez and Henehan are re-fighting the “Second Great Debate” of the 1960s with Gaddis standing in as referee.<sup>11</sup>

This “great debate” is interesting, if only as an example of academic infighting; an understanding of the different points of view expressed in this debate will, however, add to an understanding of Blainey’s, Vasquez’s, and Henehan’s works. One of the most important early critiques of quantitative behavioralism was produced by Hedley Bull in 1966.<sup>12</sup> In “*International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach*,” Bull laid out his own definitions of classical or “traditional” behavioralism and then critiqued “scientific” or quantitative behavioralism on seven key points. In defining the “classical approach,” Bull suggested that

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<sup>9</sup> Gaddis 1992-1993; 12.

<sup>10</sup> Gaddis 1992-1993; 13.

<sup>11</sup> Opposing views on this “Great Debate” were famously presented by Morton Kaplan. 1966 and Hedley Bull. 1966.

<sup>12</sup> Hedley Bull. 1966. “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach.” *World Politics* 18: 361-377.

classical behavioralism was most clearly represented by theorizing “characterized above all by explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgment and by the assumptions that if we confine ourselves to strict standards of verification and proof there is very little of significance that can be said about international relations.”<sup>13</sup> General propositions about international relations, he continued, must be derived from intuition rather than scientific reasoning; because they rely upon such intuitive reasoning, these propositions “cannot be accorded anything more than the tentative and inconclusive status appropriate to their doubtful origin.”<sup>14</sup> The practitioners of the scientific approach, Bull concluded strongly, by cutting themselves off from history and philosophy, “have deprived themselves of the means of self-criticism and in consequence have a view of their subject and its possibilities that is callow and brash.”<sup>15</sup>

Perhaps the most important response to Bull’s caustic criticism came from Morton Kaplan, who – perhaps reacting to Bull’s description of Kaplan’s writing as being valuable as another example of how the quantitativists were ignoring old traditions, such as writing well – quickly returned with a caustic analysis of his own. “I would,” he declared, “argue that it is rather the traditionalist, whose assumptions are implicit rather than explicit and whose statements are made usually without reference to context, who is more likely to mistake his model for reality . . .”<sup>16</sup> The assumption that underlies scientific, quantitative work, Kaplan maintained, was quite simple: “if the number, type, and behavior of nations differ over time, and if their military capabilities, their economic assets, and their information also vary over time, then there is some likely interconnection between these elements such that different structural and

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<sup>13</sup> Bull, 1966; 361.

<sup>14</sup> Bull, 1966; 361-362.

<sup>15</sup> Bull, 1966; 379.

<sup>16</sup> Kaplan, 1966; 17.

behavioral systems can be discerned to operate in different periods of history.”<sup>17</sup> Just to demonstrate that he too was capable of wielding a poison pen, Kaplan concluded by straight-facedly asking whether the traditionalists were stupid or simply stubborn. “Surely,” he added, “there must be something seriously wrong with an approach that devotes so much effort to such ill-informed criticism.”<sup>18</sup>

While quantitative behavioralist studies like those described by Vasquez and Henehan clearly differ greatly from historically-based behavioralist studies like that presented by Blainey, and while the authors of one set would be unlikely to communicate well with the authors of the other set, these two styles of analysis share one central and defining feature: despite Bull’s claims to the contrary, they are grounded entirely in history. “It is ironic,” wrote Kaplan, “that the traditionalists are so sure that they alone are concerned with the subject matter that they are unaware of the extent to which those applying the newer approaches are using history as a laboratory for their researches.”<sup>19</sup> In other words, where other theories of international relations are developed as theories and then tested through the application of those theories to specific historical case studies, quantitative and historically-based studies attempt to extrapolate theories *from* historical case studies. “History, experience, introspection, common sense, and logic,” Singer wrote in 1969, “do not in themselves generate evidence . . . [but reveal] ideas which must then be examined in the light of evidence.”<sup>20</sup> These theories, then, share a common methodological, behavioralist assumption, and so can be lumped together in order to judge the efficacy of behavioralist theories as a whole.

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<sup>17</sup> Kaplan, 1966; 8.

<sup>18</sup> Kaplan, 1966; 20.

<sup>19</sup> Kaplan, 1966; 15.

<sup>20</sup> J. David Singer cited in Gaddis, 1992-1993; 12.

## **The Gulf Crisis and the Persian Gulf War**

The Persian Gulf War is particularly useful as a case study in international relations, both because the crisis occurred recently enough that the events are familiar and are well-recorded and also because the crisis, while critical and complex, occurred on a small enough scale such that it can be understood in its entirety.<sup>21</sup> The events of the crisis are relatively straightforward: in the summer of 1990, Iraq began to act on its long-standing expansionist designs towards Kuwait, while the United States either delivered ambiguous messages to Iraq or else simply failed to see what Saddam Hussein was doing. Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2<sup>nd</sup> and quickly seized control of the country. The United Nations Security Council unanimously called for Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, and when Saddam Hussein refused and annexed Kuwait the United States began working to create a multilateral coalition to force Iraq back within its original borders. On August 7<sup>th</sup>, Bush dispatched United States forces to aid in the defense of Saudi Arabia. Initially named "Operation Desert Shield," this deployment quickly became the largest American overseas military commitment since the Vietnam War, and by mid-October had grown to include 200,000 military personnel.<sup>22</sup>

As the first post-Cold War international crisis, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait became a critical issue in international relations. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev broke precedent to cooperate closely on their response to Hussein's actions, and in September of 1991 met at the Helsinki Summit to discuss the Persian Gulf situation. This cooperation resulted in the passage of a number of United Nations Security Council resolutions denouncing Hussein's

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<sup>21</sup> By "small enough scale" I mean in relation to such international relations events as the Cold War, the Second World War, and even the United States' actions in Vietnam. Like the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Gulf crisis had a clear beginning and a clear ending, and occurred in a short-enough span of time such that it can be regarded in isolation. Because the events of the Gulf crisis are relatively familiar – especially given how the current crisis in the Gulf has stirred our recollections – in this paper I will only present a very quick summary of the events of the Persian Gulf War; a more detailed chronology of the conflict can be found attached to the end of this paper.

<sup>22</sup> Information on the Gulf War available online (see bibliography) and from *The Dictionary of American Foreign Affairs*.

actions and imposing economic sanctions on Iraq.<sup>23</sup> On November 29, by a vote of twelve to two (with one abstention), the Security Council passed Resolution 678, which authorized the United States to use force unless Iraq withdrew from Kuwait by Jan. 15, 1991.

By the end of 1990 the 28-nation coalition spearheaded by the United States had assembled more than 500,000 troops in Saudi Arabia. When after a failed meeting between United States Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva on January 9, 1991 Iraq still failed to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait by the UN deadline, the coalition began an aerial campaign on January 16. After Iraq ignored a final ultimatum, Bush ordered the ground offensive to begin on February 23, 1991. “The liberation of Kuwait has now entered a final phase,” Bush declared. “I have complete confidence in the ability of the coalition forces swiftly and decisively to accomplish their mission.”<sup>24</sup> In a 100-hour ground war the coalition forces recaptured Kuwait and routed the Iraqi army; Iraqi soldiers offered almost no resistance and tens of thousands of them surrendered to coalition forces. On February 27<sup>th</sup> Bush declared that Kuwait had been freed and announced a cease-fire. “Kuwait is liberated,” Bush announced. “Iraq’s army is defeated. Our military objectives are met. Kuwait is once more in the hands of Kuwaitis, in control of their own destiny.”<sup>25</sup>

### **Historical Theories and Quantitative Analyses: Blainey, Vasquez, and Henehan**

How are we best to judge the historically-based behavioralist theories of Blainey and the quantitative behavioralist theories described by Vasquez and Henehan in terms of the Persian Gulf War? In his article “*International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*,” John

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<sup>23</sup> See Appendix 2 for United Nations Security Council resolutions on Iraq. Information on UN Security Council resolutions available online at: <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>.

<sup>24</sup> George Bush, Sr., Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Ground Action in the Persian Gulf, February 23, 1991. Cited in full online at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91022302.html>.

<sup>25</sup> George Bush, Sr., Address to the Nation on the Suspension of Allied Offensive Combat Operations in the Persian Gulf, February 27, 1991. Cited in full online at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91022702.html>.

Lewis Gaddis suggests two general tests for theories of international relations: first, whether they effectively predicted such critical events as the end of the Cold War, and second, whether they are effective both at predicting and explaining events. “One way to confirm the validity of theories,” Gaddis writes, “is to see how successfully they perform *each* of the tasks expected of them. The failure to accomplish a particular task would not necessarily invalidate an entire theory, but it should raise questions in our minds. It would be a warning signal, suggesting the need to rethink underlying assumptions.”<sup>26</sup> Accepting Gaddis’ argument, then, we can test the behavioralist theories presented by Blainey, Vasquez, and Henehan by determining whether they might have predicted or explained the events of the Gulf crisis. While it seems less than totally rigorous, one way in which to test these theories is to identify specific trends or correlates of war identified by these authors and then to compare them with the events of the Gulf War to determine whether there is any further correlation.

Geoffrey Blainey’s *The Causes of War* (The Free Press: New York, 1988) is a well-written and engaging work that leads its readers along a well-structured path to an understanding of what Blainey believes to be the reasons states ultimately choose armed conflict as a means of solving disagreements, disputes, and conflicts. “Among historians,” he explains, “most controversies hinge on the detailed causes of particular wars rather than on wider assumptions.”<sup>27</sup> Blainey’s goal is to move beyond an understanding of such detailed causes and to instead reach general conclusions on how and why wars begin. Blainey, who is himself an economic historian, uses historical examples in two separate ways: first, to attack and discredit established theories of the causes of war, and second to help build up his own somewhat suspect theoretical framework for understanding what he thinks those causes might be. In terms of the “Great Debate,” Blainey

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<sup>26</sup> Gaddis, 1992-1993, 10.

<sup>27</sup> Blainey, Geoffrey, *The Causes of War*. (New York: The Free Press, 1973, 1988.) ix.

clearly comes down on the side of the historically-oriented traditionalists; his work rests on the assumption that particular events in history are so representative of events in general that they can stand as proof of general trends. This historical methodology proves particularly useful in disproving existent theories of the causes of war, but proves particularly useless in helping Blainey prove his own theories of how wars are caused.

In *The Causes of War* Blainey identifies several key “flaws in current theories of war and peace,” among which he includes the historical tendency to blame capitalists, dictators, monarchs, or other individuals or pressure groups for warfare, the commonly-held belief in the “scapegoat” theory of war, which assumes that rulers facing internal troubles start foreign wars in the hopes that victory will promote peace at home, the general assumption that war-weariness always promotes peace, and especially the tendency of liberals to hold to the Manchester theory, which argues that increasing contact between nations through language, travel, and the exchange of commodities and ideas, promotes peace.<sup>28</sup> Blainey develops his own theory of the causes of warfare as well; wars, he explains, tend to occur when two nations disagree on their relative strength and cease when the fighting nations agree on their relative strength, and occur when each nation believes that it will gain more by negotiating than by fighting.<sup>29</sup> A formula for measuring international power, Blainey argues, is therefore essential for stopping warfare. “Ironically,” he notes, “the most useful formula is warfare.”<sup>30</sup>

John A. Vasquez’s and Marie T. Henahan’s *The Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 1992, 1999) is, in contrast to Blainey’s work, an interesting compilation of the scientific data on war and peace from the Correlates of War (COW) project at the University of Michigan. This work does exactly what the authors set out

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<sup>28</sup> Blainey, 1973, 1988, 291-292.

<sup>29</sup> Blainey, 1973, 1988; 291-293.

<sup>30</sup> Blainey, 1973, 1988; 294.

for it to do: it presents important articles written on war and peace from a scientific, quantitative-behavioralist perspective and puts them into perspective. Vasquez's and Henehan's work is designed for students unfamiliar with statistical methodology or political science jargon, and through its attached "learning package" it presents a tutorial on the subject that enables the book to stand on its own. This work does *not* add notably to the scholarship in the field, however, as Henehan and Vasquez are far more concerned with summary than with criticism or judgment; as such they do not support or attack individual conclusions, instead leaving such academic responses to the other authors whose articles they cite. Vasquez and Henehan clearly come down on the opposite side of the "Great Debate" from Blainey; "Those of us committed to the scientific study of war," explains Vasquez, "believe that part of the reason that so little progress has been made in understanding [why people fight wars] is that social inquiry has not followed a sufficiently rigorous method."<sup>31</sup>

While Vasquez and Henehan are far more interested in presenting and refereeing differing theories derived from the Correlates of War data, they too present some larger conclusions on how and why wars are fought – possibly because they have demonstrated that the quantitative behavioralist school has not yet produced and *agreed on* general theories. "There is not," Henehan explains, "as much integration of the findings as one might expect."<sup>32</sup> At the end of *The Scientific Study of Peace and War*, therefore, Vasquez presents a "conclusions" chapter in which, according to his wife, he "finds that wars between major states tend to be preceded by the making of alliances, military buildups, the use of realpolitik bargaining that becomes increasingly coercive, and a series of crises, one of which eventually interrupts into war."<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Vasquez, John A. and Marie T. Henehan, *The Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader*. (Lanham: Lexington Books, 1992, 1999.) xix.

<sup>32</sup> Vasquez and Henehan, 1992, 1999; 370.

<sup>33</sup> Vasquez and Henehan, 1992, 1999; 369.

Henehan admits that Vasquez's conclusions are not truly supported by any objective data, but are instead simply new hypotheses. "Vasquez's article," she explains, "is an exercise in inductive scientific theory construction . . . it has yet to be tested."<sup>34</sup> Regardless, these elements stand as Vasquez's theory, and should be exposed to the same sort of analysis as are the elements that comprise Blainey's theory.

Both Blainey's theories and Vasquez's and Henehan's theories succeed admirably in helping to explain how and why war broke out in the Persian Gulf, though there are elements of the crisis and the conflict that either fall outside these theories or else directly contradict some of Blainey's, Vasquez's, or Henehan's conclusions. Blainey argues that war is more likely when two nations disagree on their relative strength; if this is the case, then a United States war with Iraq was almost predestined. As H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the allied forces in the Gulf, explained in his autobiography, when the United States deployed to the Gulf military officers and political leaders had serious doubts about the ability of United States forces to stand up to what was then the fourth-largest army in the world. At the time of the crisis various defense experts were split almost exactly into two camps: those who thought that the United States automatically outclassed Iraq, and those who thought that the United States was walking directly into a bloodbath.

Vasquez's criteria for war are almost equally effective in explaining how the conflict developed. Wars, Vasquez noted, are marked by the making of alliances, military buildups, the use of realpolitik bargaining that becomes increasingly coercive, and a series of crises, one of which erupts into war. During the conflict the United States worked hard to develop a multilateral coalition – and Iraq did its best through missile attacks on Israel to disrupt that alliance and create one of its own among Arab nations. The period before the war (both in the

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<sup>34</sup> Vasquez and Henehan, 1992, 1999; 370.

short term and the long term) was marked by an extensive military build-up in both Iraq (during the Iran-Iraq war) and the United States (during the 1980s, near the end of the Cold War). The escalation of the conflict in the Gulf was marked by Saddam Hussein's attempt to use civilian hostages to shield military targets, Iraq's threat to use weapons of mass destruction, and the Allies' economic sanctions, which had the direct result of starving the civilian population of Iraq of food and medication – truly realpolitik bargaining of a vicious sort.

While the Persian Gulf War thus seems to demonstrate the validity of these behavioralist theories of warfare, the crisis does present a problem in that it seems to contradict some of Blainey's and Vasquez's conclusions. Vasquez's final point is that conflicts are marked by a series of crises, one of which erupts into warfare; the Persian Gulf War was not really marked by a series of crises, but rather by a single crisis which proceeded inexorably towards an almost-foregone conclusion. Blainey argues that he has destroyed some existent theories of warfare through his behaviorist, historical methodology – but three of Blainey's "flaws" seem to help to explain the outbreak of war between the coalition forces and Iraq. While Blainey argues that the "scapegoat" theory of warfare is wrong – and indeed it seems clear that although Saddam Hussein is a despotic leader, he has successfully managed either to win Iraqi approval or else to force the Iraqi public into submission, and had no real need to divert attention from the Iraqi internal situation – various scholars and pundits have suggested that Bush pushed the war in order to solidify his own popularity within the United States. While Blainey castigates the Manchester school – and indeed the fact that Iraq and Kuwait are neighbors and that they share a common language, a common religion and common customs, and were engaged in extensive cross-border trade seems to support Blainey's conclusions in this regard – a good argument can be made for how *lack* of cultural understanding between the United States and Iraq led to an

expanded conflict. Depending upon how we interpret the events of the crisis and of the war, it seems, we can find both support for and problems with the behaviorist theories put forward in *The Causes of War* and *The Scientific Study of War and Peace*.

## **Conclusion**

In some ways, of course, the styles of analysis and conclusions of this paper are themselves unfair, unsurprising, and uninteresting. My conclusions, that behaviorist theory succeeds in some ways in explaining the Gulf crisis while it fails in other ways, is hardly shocking; these theories were not intended to describe *every* conflict at *every* time in *every* detail, but rather to help explain trends in international crises. Indeed, I note that I have done exactly what I once criticized Blainey for doing: I have identified a particular event and have used the details of that event to criticize and attack generalized theories of trends in conflict. That said, I think that behaviorist theories of this sort are in some sense intrinsically flawed: Blainey, Vasquez, and Henahan are all treating history as a pot of homogenous items from which to take examples. The only real difference between them is that while historical behaviorists like Bull and Blainey work with small spoons so as to capture choice bits, quantitative behaviorists like Singer, Kaplan, Vasquez and Henahan make sure to use really large strainers so as to capture everything.

The behaviorist theories advanced by Blainey, Vasquez, and Henahan appear to be valuable in some ways and worthless in others; the problem, though, is that our judgment of whether they are valuable or worthless varies according to how we interpret the events of particular crises. This variance leads me to agree with John Lewis Gaddis: “the behaviorist enterprise of attempting to theorize about, and then to forecast, the actions of individuals, societies, nations, and groups of nations on the basis only of observable, calculable evidence and

without taking into account the critical variable of self-awareness is, ultimately, an attempt to transform clouds into clocks.”<sup>35</sup> It is, Gaddis adds, an incomplete, misleading, and washed-out representation of reality. To Gaddis’ comment I would add this: not only does behavioralism of this type seem to lead to failures to predict or forecast the actions of individual or state actors, but it also seems to lead to a failure to *explain* conflicts in a clear and rigorous fashion. Behavioralists need to be careful of how they use history. History itself is contextual; we should not expect generalizable theories to come from past events *unless and until* we can demonstrate how, when, and in what ways the past resembles the present and the future.

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<sup>35</sup> Gaddis, 1992-1993; 39.

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# Appendix 1: Selected Gulf War Chronology

Compiled by Samuel Brenner from various sources including USA Today Online, PBS Online, and Crusade: the Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War.

## 1990

- July *Internal Look*, a U.S. war game, shows Saudi Arabia could be defended against Iraqi invaders, but at terrible cost.
- August 2 Iraq invades Kuwait.
- August 5 President Bush declares invasion "will not stand."
- August 6 King Fahd meets with Richard Cheney, requests U.S. military assistance.
- August 8 Initial U.S. Air force fighter planes arrive in Saudi Arabia.
- August 28 Secret Israeli delegation flies to Washington to stress likelihood of Iraqi attack on Israel if war begins.
- September 18 Schwarzkopf asks four Army planners to begin work on ground offensive.
- October 21 Colin Powell flies to Riyadh to discuss offensive plans.
- October 31 Bush decides to double U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia; decision kept secret until November 8.
- November 29 UN Security Council authorizes use of "all means necessary" to eject Iraq from Kuwait.
- December 6 First ship carrying VII Corps equipment arrives in Saudi Arabia from Germany.

## 1991

- January 9 James Baker meets Tariq Aziz in Geneva in unsuccessful effort to find a peaceful solution.
- January 12 Congress authorizes use of force.
- January 15 UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal. Schwarzkopf accuses Air Force of ignoring orders by not including Republican Guard in initial bombing sorties.

## War:

### Day 1: Wednesday, Jan. 16

Desert Storm begins at 7 p.m. EST (3 a.m. Jan. 17 in Iraq) with massive air and missile attacks on targets in Iraq, Kuwait. President Bush: "We will not fail."

### Day 2: Thursday, Jan. 17

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein declares: "The great showdown has begun! The mother of all battles is under way." Iraqi Scud missiles strike Israel. Scud fired at Saudi Arabia is downed by U.S. Patriot missile - first anti-missile missile fired in combat.

### Day 3: Friday, Jan. 18

Amid retaliation speculation, President Bush says Israel has promised not to respond to Iraq's attack.

### Day 4: Saturday, Jan. 19

At least three Scuds explode in Tel Aviv, Israel, injuring about 17. Israel vows to defend itself but refrains. United States rushes in Patriots, making Army crews first U.S. soldiers to defend Israel. U.S. troops raid oil platforms off Kuwait, capturing first Iraqi prisoners of war.

### Day 7: Tuesday, Jan. 22

Iraq fires six Scud missiles at Saudi Arabia; one is destroyed by Patriot, others fall harmlessly. Iraq torches Kuwaiti oil wells, tanks. A Scud eludes U.S. Patriot missiles and hits Tel Aviv. Three people die.

### Day 8: Wednesday, Jan. 23

President Bush urges Saddam Hussein be brought to "justice," suggesting removal of Iraqi president could be a goal.

### Day 10: Friday, Jan. 25

Japan says it will send military aircraft to assist allies in non-combat situations. Scud missiles are fired at Israel and Saudi Arabia. Two people killed.

### Day 11: Saturday, Jan. 26

Massive oil spill grows, threatening Saudi Arabia's industrial and desalination plants and gulf environment. Iraqi warplanes land in Iran. Iran says it has seized them. More than 75,000 protesters march in Washington, D.C.

**Day 14: Tuesday, Jan. 29**

United States, Soviet Union issue communiqué offering Iraq cease-fire if it makes "unequivocal commitment" to withdraw.

**Day 15: Wednesday, Jan. 30**

Scores of Iraqi tanks, thousands of troops advance into Saudi Arabia. Attacks are countered by U.S. Marines, Saudi and Qatari troops. Eleven Marines die.

Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, allied commander, says allies have air supremacy and are reducing Scud threat.

**Day 16: Thursday, Jan. 31**

Saudi and Qatari troops, backed by U.S. artillery, retake Khafji, Saudi Arabia.

Sheik Abdul-Aziz Bin Baz, Saudis' leading interpreter of Islamic law, calls Saddam Hussein "enemy of God."

**Day 25: Saturday, Feb. 9**

Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin Powell meet for more than eight hours with Desert Storm commander, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, other military leaders.

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev warns that military operations in Persian Gulf war threaten to exceed U.N. mandate; he says he's sending envoy to Baghdad for talks with Saddam Hussein.

**Day 26: Sunday, Feb. 10**

Saddam Hussein addresses his nation for first time since three days after war started, pledging victory and praising "steadfastness, faith and light in the chests of Iraqis."

**Day 31: Friday, Feb. 15**

Iraq says it is prepared to withdraw from Kuwait, but adds conditions, including Israeli pullout from occupied Arab territories, forgiveness of Iraqi debts and allied payment of costs of rebuilding Iraq.

President Bush dismisses Iraqi offer as "cruel hoax." - Allied forces continue moving supplies toward front in preparation for launch of ground war.

**Day 33: Sunday, Feb. 17**

President Bush says Iraq's takeover of Kuwait will end "very, very soon."

U.S. and Iraqi troops clash in seven incidents along Saudi-Kuwait border; 20 Iraqis surrender to Apache helicopter fire.

Iraq's foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, arrives in Moscow for talks with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. He is quoted en route as saying it's up to allies to act on Iraq's peace proposal.

U.S. military, intelligence officials estimate 15% of Iraq's fighting forces in Kuwait area have been killed or wounded.

**Day 35: Tuesday, Feb. 19**

Baghdad Radio reports Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz has returned to Baghdad with Soviet peace proposal.

President Bush says Soviet proposal falls "well short" of what's needed to end war.

Iranian newspaper cites Iraqi official as saying Iraq has suffered 20,000 dead, 60,000 wounded.

**Day 37: Thursday, Feb. 21**

Soviet spokesman Vitaly Ignatenko announces Iraq, Soviet Union have agreed on plan that could lead to Iraqi withdrawal.

Saddam Hussein declares Iraq remains ready to fight ground war.

Defense Secretary Dick Cheney says allies are preparing "one of the largest land assaults of modern times."

**Day 38: Friday, Feb. 22**

President Bush rejects Soviet peace plan, deplors Iraq's "scorched- earth" destruction of Kuwaiti oil fields.

He demands Iraq begin withdrawal from Kuwait by noon Feb. 23 to avoid ground war.

Iraqi information official brands U.S. position "shameful ultimatum."

Soviet Union announces eight-point withdrawal plan.

**Day 39: Saturday, Feb. 23**

Allies' ground offensive begins at 8 p.m. EST (4 a.m. Feb. 24 Saudi time).

Defense Secretary Dick Cheney halts news briefings on war.

At 10:02 p.m. EST, President Bush tells nation, "The liberation of Kuwait has entered the final phase."

Bush authorizes commander Norman Schwarzkopf to "use all forces available, including ground forces, to expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait."

**Day 43: Wednesday, Feb. 27**

Kuwaiti troops raise emirate's flag in Kuwait City.

President Bush declares suspension of offensive combat and lays out conditions for permanent cease-fire.

*Appendix 2: United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Iraq*  
*Online at <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>*

Resolution 660, Aug. 2, 1990: Condemns Iraqi invasion of Kuwait - Vote 14-0, 1 abstention

Resolution 661, Aug. 6, 1990: Imposes economic sanctions against Iraq - Vote 13-0, 2 abstentions

Resolution 662, Aug. 9, 1990: Declares Iraqi annexation of Kuwait null and void - Vote 15-0

Resolution 664, Aug. 18, 1990: Calls for the immediate release of foreigners from Iraq and Kuwait - Vote 15-0

Resolution 665, 1st half and 2nd half, Aug. 25, 1990: Authorizes the use of force to halt maritime shipping to and from Iraq - Vote 13-0, 2 abstentions

Resolution 666, Sept. 13, 1990: Establishes guidelines for humanitarian aid to Iraq and Kuwait - Vote 13-0, 2 abstentions

Resolution 667, Sept. 16, 1990: Condemns Iraq and demands protection of diplomatic personnel - Vote 15-0

Resolution 669, Sept. 24, 1990: Authorizes examination of requirements for economic assistance under U.N. Article 50 - Vote 15-0

Resolution 670, Sept. 25, 1990: Condemns Iraq and confirms economic embargo, including air - Vote 14-1

Resolution 674, Oct. 29, 1990: Condemns Iraq and calls for release of third-country nationals and provision of food - Vote 13-0, 2 abstentions

Resolution 677, Nov. 28, 1990: Condemns Iraqi attempts to alter Kuwaiti demographics - Vote 15-0

Resolution 678, Nov. 29, 1990: Authorizes the use of force to uphold resolutions unless Iraq withdraws by Jan. 15, 1991, deadline - Vote 12-2, 1 abstention

Resolution 686, March 2, 1991: Demands Iraq cease all hostile action as and abide by resolutions - Vote 11-1, 3 abstentions

Resolution 687, April 3, 1991: Sets forth permanent cease-fire - Vote 12-1, 2 abstentions